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This paper discusses social housing policy in Brazil since the 1990s by analyzing government programs’
institutional arrangements, their sources of revenues and the formatting of related ﬁnancial systems.
The conclusion suggests that all these arrangements have not constituted a comprehensive housing policy
with the clear aim of serving to enhance housing conditions in the country. Housing ‘policies’ since the
1990s – as proposed by Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and
Luis Ina´cio Lula da Silva’s governments (in the latter case, despite much progress towards subsidized
investment programs) – have sought to consolidate ﬁnancial instruments in line with global markets,
restructuring theway private interests operatewithin the system, a necessary however incomplete course
of action. Different from rhetoric, this has resulted in failure as the more fundamental social results for the
poor have not yet been achieved.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
As suggested in the title, this paper pursues a straightforward
objective: to brieﬂy analyse the trajectory of social housing policy
in Brazil, proposed and implemented by the Federal Government,
from the 1990s to date. The 1990 decade started with a new,
democratically elected government – that of President Fernando
Collor deMello (or Collor). Thirty years having elapsed since the last
presidential election, there were reasons for hope and optimism,
despite the sharp economic crisis. The Collor government, however,
came to an abrupt endwith the impeachment of the President at the
end 1992 (Valença, 2002). Itamar Franco, who was vice-president
and had run with Collor under the same ticket, took over power.
He invited Fernando Henrique Cardoso (or FHC, or Cardoso), the
well-known sociologist, to be ﬁnance minister in the command of
the country’s economy. Soon after that, Cardoso and his team
launched the Real Plan, to stabilise the Brazilian currency and solve
the chronic problem of inﬂation which had dogged the country
since the early 1980s and which none of a succession of plans,
however unorthodox, hadmanaged to control for longer than a few
months. The success of the plan was outstanding in breaking with´ticas Pu´blicas, Universidade
ri, 5250 Bloco C – 101, Can-
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tional (2009), doi:10.1016/j.hthe spiralling inﬂation, and so was the timing of its launch, serving
Cardoso well in his pursuit of the country’s presidency in the 1994
elections.
To keep with the ‘Real: strong currency’ policy, Cardoso sacri-
ﬁced all else to keep in line with IMF orthodoxy by expanding on
the Collor government’s reforms: the commercial openings (end of
import restrictions), the privatisation program, the ‘reform’ of the
state, etc. At the same time, the government operated a policy of
skyrocketing interest rates, attracting an inﬂuxof ‘hot’ money to the
country and ‘muddling through’ the problem of the public debt.
While there was money ﬂowing into the country, the government
managed to keep the Real closely linked to the dollar. But following
the Asian and Russian crises (1997–1998), the government lost
control of the situation. Capital ﬂight meant that much of the
country’s foreign reserves had to be used to hold the Real from
a drastic devaluation. Later, however, with help from the IMF, the
government managed to re-establish its position in time for the
re-election. Cardoso could then run under the same Strong Real
ticket. For the majority of Brazilians, the imminent return of
inﬂation was not evident until after the 1998 election. Following
the election, a new run on the Real caused the government to agree
– with help from the US Government – on a huge package of loans
with the IMF. The government had to relax its ‘zero-inﬂation’
policy, which in any event had been more like a single ﬁgure
inﬂation policy. The Real crisis effectively meant further tightening
of government expenditure in crucial areas of social policy
(Fonseca, 1998; Morais, Saad Filho, & Coelho, 1999; Valença, 1998).ory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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Silva (or Lula), a member of theWorkers’ Party (PT), ﬁnally won the
election at the end of 2002. While the country expected more
drastic, progressive measures, the government of Lula started – and
so continued to be – indeed conservative and cautious. He invited
a well-known international banking executive to take over as the
Central Bank president. Lula’s choices for the ﬁnancial areas of the
government, although belonging to the PT, were known to follow
amore conservative andmoderate line. Lulawas re-elected in 2006
despite a number of scandals – as the so-called mensala˜o2 –
involving the PT and some of his close advisors, as were the cases of
the government’s main political as well as, later, themain economic
spokespersons. Both of them had to go.
In any case, the Lula government has pursued a conservative
approach in regards to the economy, following an inﬂation target and
public expenditure control policy – thus Brazilian economic growth
has been below world average –, having accumulated substantial
international reserves and having repaid – in advance – much of the
country’s foreign debt. This effort has not come without high costs.
Despite some undeniable progress in certain social areas as education
and poverty eradication programs, this was expected to progress
much faster. At the start of his second government, Lula launched
the Programa de Aceleraça˜o do Crescimento (PAC), a comprehensive
economic program to speed up and foster economic growth. Here,
provision of heavy infra-structure (roads, telecommunications, power
stations, etc.) was the focus, with investments in the order of R$690
billions, or approximately US$280 billions, at December 2008 rates.
In sum, the climate of reforms and ‘modernisation’ has set
the tone since the 1990s. This modernisation has tended towards
beneﬁting ‘market’ solutions and thus is in line with the so-called
neo-liberal globalisation orchestrated by trans-national corpora-
tions with help from world institutions like the IMF and the World
Bank. Although new housing policy proposals during the 1990s do
not entirely follow this pattern, in a country with such discrepancies
in the distribution of income andwealth and such acute problems of
poverty, a succession of governments have found it much easier to
implement more regressive, market-oriented proposals than more
progressive, redistributive – although more costly, however neces-
sary – alternatives.
Bearing in mind the 1990s’ and the 2000’s political and economic
scenarios, this paper discusses the main housing policy proposals
which emerged, after the democratisation of the country, and will
show which ones materialised into actual government programs. It
beginswithasketchof thecrisisof thehousingprovisionsystemunder
the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional da Habitaça˜o - BNH3),
in vogue until then.The end of the BNH/SFH era: 1964–1990
The 1990s round of housing policy proposals should also be seen
in the light of the crisis and partial dismantling of the previous
system of housing provision in the country. Set up by the military
governments, the BNH (1964) and, later, the Sistema Financeiro da
Habitaça˜o (or SFH,1966) hadproduced almost 5millionnewhousing
units in just over 20 years, a considerable number, especially if seen
in relation to earlier schemes of public housing promotion in the
country (Institutos de Aposentadoria e Pensa˜o, or IAPs; Fundaça˜o da
Casa Popular, or FCP)(Andrade & Azevedo, 1982; Bonduki, 1998;
Melo, 1992). Still, the system’s institutional and operational formats2 In this, the government was accused of having used the party to make monthly
payments to a number of Congress members so that they voted for the government
in critical congressional matters.
3 Acronyms are a feature of Brazilian institutions.
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to the Ministry of the Cities, Habitat International (2009), doi:10.1016/j.hwere not well integrated. On the one hand the implementing insti-
tutions had to ensure that the system was self supporting and self
ﬁnancing. On the other they had to deal with contradictions within
the system that made that very difﬁcult. The system counted on 3
major sources of ﬁnance: ﬁrst, the compulsory ‘savings’ deposited in
the FGTS4 accounts (by employers in beneﬁt of their employees),
which was used by the BNH to ﬁnance social housing; second, the
voluntary passbook savings accounts system, which was used by
SBPE5 institutions (banks, building societies, savings associations) to
ﬁnance middle-class housing; and third, proﬁts from the repay-
ments of mortgages conceded. All of these depended on how well
the economy was doing. In general, the system ﬁrst ﬁnanced
contractors as well as the publicly-owned housing companies
(Companhias Habitacionais, or COHABs) and housing cooperatives
(Instituto de Orientaça˜o a`s Cooperativas Habitacionais, or INOCOOPs)
for the building of new housing (supply) and then ﬁnanced home
owners for the full (or partial) mortgage on those new housing
produced (demand). During this time, there were very few cases in
which the system ﬁnanced the acquisition of second-hand housing
or the production of rental housing. And although in theory there
were schemes that allowed cross-utilisation of SBPE (savings
accounts) and BNH (FGTS) resources, in practice the two legs of the
SFH operated quite independently. It is worth noting also that
the Brazilian SFH has always been a centralised system of housing
ﬁnance but with a decentralised network of housing promoters
throughout the regions (e.g., COHABs, cooperatives organized under
the INOCOOP, building societies, pension funds and private house-
builders)(Azevedo, 1996, 2007; Valença, 1992, 1999, 2001).
Following the general economic crisis at the beginning of the
1980s, all the system’s sources of ﬁnance were affected negatively.
As unemployment soared and incomes declined, workers with-
drew from the FGTS and savings accounts, and mortgage holders
defaulted. This problem was exacerbated when the Figueiredo
government implemented its ‘waterfall’ income policy, index-
linking the annual adjustments of salaries and wages below the
inﬂation rate while mortgage repayments continued to be index-
linked to full inﬂation. By 1984, the crisis had deepened. The BNH,
under Nelson da Matta’s administration, launched a bonus scheme
to compensate mortgage holders for loss of purchasing power.
However, the measure was short-lived and, in 1985, the Sarney
government decided to ‘solve’ the problem for good, index-linking
the repayment of mortgages to more or less half of the period’s
inﬂation. Now, although solving the mortgage-holders’ solvency
problem, the system’s problem had become worse as both mort-
gage holders’ income and repayments lagged behind the stock of
the mortgage debt. That is, that measure meant that at the end of
the mortgage a debt would remain unpaid. In this case, the Fundo
da Compensaça˜o da Variaça˜o Salarial (or FCVS), a fund under the
responsibility of the government which had been created during
the 1970s with mortgage holders’ contributions, was supposed to
clear the debts owed to the creditor institutions – private and
public. But due to the huge difference in the indices adopted for
the monetary correction of wages, repayments and the growth of
the debt, this fund would be insufﬁcient to cover the remaining
debts as contracts came to an end (Valença, 1992).
In November 1986, in the midst of the second Cruzado Plan, the
Sarney government decided to close the BNH, the head of the
system, which employed nearly 10,000 people. Employees were4 Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço. This fund yielded monetary correction
(inﬂation) plus 3% a year.
5 Sistema Brasileiro de Poupança e Empre´stimo. The savings accout system yielded
monetary correction (inﬂation) plus 6% a year. This is a system to promote housing
for middle-class people, not analysed in this paper.
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Federal, or CEF, also called CAIXA (another public bank), which also
took over many of the BNH’s functions. Although changing the
system’s institutional format, the SFH’s operational format,
which prompted its misfortune, remained largely unchanged. From
this time until mid-1990s, the SFH was in disarray, performing
erratically6. The Sarney government also implemented a scheme –
through the so-called Secretaria Especial de Assuntos Comunita´rios
(or SEAC), a secretary linked to the President’s Ofﬁce – to promote
self-build upgrading of social housing using small budget alloca-
tions, but the results were much short of expectations. Out of
500,000 planned starts, only about 20,000 were completed. With
the demise of the Cruzado Plan towards the end of 1986 and
the failure of the follow-up Bresser and Summer plans to control
inﬂation, the Sarney government found itself in no position polit-
ically to prevent inﬂation from galloping towards hyper-inﬂation at
the end of 1989. The conditions both for the election and start of the
Collor government were set (Valença, 1998, 1999).The Collor period: 1990–1992
The Collor government acknowledged the poor housing situation
in the country, forwhich it held its predecessors responsible, butwas
full of ideas and grand plans to tackle the problem, setting its house-
building targets at very high levels, that is, at 4 million (Brasil, 1991;
MAS/SNH,1991). However, Collor’s ‘modernity’ rhetoricmaterialised
into housing policy proposals which had a pro-market orientation,
seeking to fuel the market, by granting private enterprise favourable
operational conditions, that is, unlike previous schemes, builders
themselves could now promote a social housing project. Having said
this, the government was pretty much conscious that its proposals
offered, if anything, only a partial solution to the housing crisis.
Although not spelt out, this is evident from several ofﬁcial docu-
ments, as in the following passage: ‘In respect to the operation of
the SFH, it is necessary to give differentiated treatment to the poor
through the concession of explicit subsidies by the three govern-
ment spheres’ (Brazil, 1991:86) (our translation).
The government’s recognition that the poorneeded to have access
to ’explicit’ subsidies in order to afford housing clearly departed from
the military’s entrepreneurial view that the system of housing
provision had to be self-ﬁnanced and from Sarney’s patronising
support for the ineffective budget-fundedupgrading programs under
the SEAC. The newly created Ministe´rio de Aça˜o Social, or MAS, had
a National Housing Secretariat, or SNH, as one of its wings (MAS,
1991). In a more detailed document, the government clearly states
that it was one of MAS’s main objectives to: ‘avoid non-returnable
ﬁnancial transfers, even when the beneﬁciaries are those lower
income groups’ (MAS, 1991:10)(our translation). The Collor gov-
ernment’s alleged ‘commitment’ to developing an ‘explicit’ policy of
public subsidies for the poor vis-a`-vis amarket sector thus contrasted
with its actual course of action. In short, the Collor government must
have relied on the states and municipalities for the concession of
subsidies as no proposal nor action was taken to promote this policy
at the federal level.
Instead of subsidies for the poor, the government proposed the
development of ‘modern’ market instruments to beneﬁt the
provision of ‘social’ housing. The establishment of ‘new mecha-
nisms’ to attract savings – domestically and overseas – with terms6 On the SFH crisis, see Valença (1992); on the situation leading to and following
the closure of the BNH, see Valença (1999, 2007). On the BNH-SFH format and
development, see Andrade and Azevedo (1982), Bolafﬁ (1991), Maricato (1987) and
Valladares (1986). See also Albuquerque (1986), Azevedo (1996), Lima and Gomes
(1987, 1989), Melo (1992) and Shidlo (1990a,1990b).
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government, was proposed in a bill sent to the National Congress
by the end of 1992. The bill proposed the creation of Real Estate
Investment Funds (Fundos de Investimento Imobilia´rio), operating
in the secondary markets, inspired by the extensive use of this
approach in the USA and Britain, a measure that was only opera-
tional later, from 1994, and integrated the Real Estate Finance
System (Sistema de Financiamento Imobilia´rio – SFI) in 1997.
In a similar fashion, the government also proposed the creation of
a so-called National Housing System, or Sistema Nacional de Hab-
itaça˜o, to introduce ‘innovative’ and ‘democratic’ procedures, espe-
cially around public participation in decision-making. There were
plans to encourage greater involvement of states and municipalities
in the ﬁeld by providing expertise on economic, technical, ﬁnancial
and tax management for the more local programs. The SNH also
envisaged providing ‘biases’ for the ‘well-functioning’ of the existing
FGTS Trustee Council (Conselho Curador do FGTS), for greater inte-
gration with the planned National Housing System. According to
the government, the establishment of the transient National
Housing Committee inaugurated a dialogue between government
and society. However, this short-lived committee was dominated by
government ofﬁcials.
In line with this, to encourage the municipal governments to
play a more active role, the government proposed the creation of
‘municipal housing funds’, or Fundos Municipais de Habitaça˜o (MAS/
SNH, 1991). Through this, municipal governments could promote
their own housing policies and have greater independence from
the federal government. The initiative took the form of proposed
‘instructions’ tomunicipalities on how to set up the fund, presenting
among other things a sample of the municipal bill to be proposed by
the mayors to their local councillors. The fund was to be earmarked
for housing, but the source and ﬂows of funds envisioned by the
government – municipal revenues, domestic and foreign credits,
yields from ﬁnancial investments, donations and ﬁnes – were not
straightforward nor ’regular’, in theway that the government argued
that the fund should be structured.
However, not every housing policy proposal was a ‘failure’ in the
sense that itdidnotget implemented. Someof theCollorgovernment’s
proposals went ahead, for instance, the set up of the Housing Trust
Companies (or conso´rcio habitacional) in1990, a schemecomparable to
the existing popular ones which had served to ﬁnance such items
as cars and electronic gadgets (Boletim Habitaça˜o, August 1991).
Although the Collor government claimed the initiative for itself, the
creation of this scheme had been under study since the Sarney
administrationandwasoneof thedemandsof representativebodies in
the construction sector. Sarney had set up a work group to study the
questionon23December1985.Thescheme,however, lackingaproper
normative structure, was inoperative during the Collor government.
The Collor government also set out to reform the 1979 Tenancy
Law to make the sector more proﬁtable and attractive to investors.
Again, the Sarney government preceded Collor’s in this respect,
sending, in March 1988, a bill to Congress to reform the tenancy
law. In contrast to Collor’s proposal, Sarney’s bill, in addition to
a number of deregulating measures, proposed to establish a ‘social
rental sector’ in private hands, in which there were limits to rent
levels (which would then follow a tenant’s pay rises) in exchange
for reductions in landlords’ income tax (Sarney,1990). Under Collor,
the new Tenancy Law of October 1991, implemented in December
1992, reduced the time for contract revisions to 30 months (from
60) and allowed shorter-term contracts under speciﬁed conditions:
for furnished dwellings, for instance. Inspired by the British ‘Right-
to-Buy’, the government also began the sale of government owned
housing, or the ‘function dwellings’ in Brası´lia, in the wake of its
‘patrimonial reforms’. This was a stock of housing rented at subsi-
dized prices to government personnel due to their high rate ofory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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estates were offered at well below market prices and ﬁnanced at
discount interest rates. In total, 34 mansions and 10,600 ﬂats were
sold (CEF, 1991; Jornal do Brasil, 1993 January 1993).
Despite its total failure to design and implement a scheme of
housing provision to beneﬁt the very poor (those earning up to 3
legal minimumwages), the Collor government set up a new scheme
of ’social’ housing promotion based on the new FGTS law. The law
had been written during the Sarney term. The law (n.8036) was
approved by the National Congress on 11 May 1990, and conﬁrmed
by Decree n.99,684 of 8 November 1990, thus shortly after the
inauguration of the new government. Collor’s new law simply
adapted the new scheme to theministerial reforms of the start of the
term. This replaced Law n.7839 of 12 October 1989, which had
replaced Law n.5107 of 13 September 1966, which had created the
FGTS, in vogue until then. The law set up the conditions underwhich
the FGTS money could be used for ’social’ housing, sanitation and
urban development as well as creating a newmechanism for control
and supervision, notably the FGTS Trustee Council. The council, set
up in October 1990, consisted of 3 representatives from employers, 3
from employees, theMinister of the Economy, Finance and Planning,
the Minister of Labour and Social Security (the council’s president),
the Minister of Social Action, and the presidents of 2 major public
banks: Caixa Econoˆmica Federal (CEF) and Banco do Brazil (BB). It
was thus dominated by government representatives. In addition to
FGTS resources, the Collor government’s newly designed housing
programs could only count on meagre budget allocations stemming
from the proceeds of the government’s sell-out of ’function’ dwell-
ings in Brası´lia. A new scheme, masterminded under MAS while CEF
was the ﬁnancial operator, became the Immediate Action Program
for Housing (PAIH). Nearly half a million new housing units were
built during 1990–1994 under the fourmainprogramsmaking use of
FGTS money: PAIH, PROHAP (Programa de Habitaça˜o Popular), PEP
(Programa Empresa´rio Popular) and Cooperativa (Valença, 2007).
In all 4 main programs private enterprise was invited to take
part as housing promoters, on whose behalf the government
created a number of conditions to grant them risk-free, proﬁtable
working conditions. The government insisted with private entre-
preneurs that: ‘Social housing, today, in Brazil, is a proﬁtable
business, which attracts new investments’ (MAS/SNH,1992:2). And
more: ‘We showed traditional constructors that social housing
could be a proﬁtable and attractive business’ (p.9)(our translations).
Initially, there was some resistance to the plans, but in 1991, 67% of
projects being ﬁnanced under the PAIH programwere promoted by
private contractors. This kept contractors going in the middle of the
crisis, argued the Housing Secretary (Boletim Habitaça˜o, August
1991; Pugh, 1994; Valença, 2007).
The Itamar transition: 1993–1994
When Itamar Franco became president, in the aftermath
of Collor’s impeachment, the housing provision system around
MAS/CEF was already in dire straits. All new approvals had been
cancelled since the end of 1991 because of two reasons: the rate of
approvals had outstripped the country’s capacity to build using
FGTS resource base and the general recession brought about by the
inception and demise of the Collor Plan. But this was not all.
The Itamar government had to ﬁnd funds (FGTS, FDS – Fundo de
Desenvolvimento Social, budget) to complete 260,000 houses which
had been started during the Collor period (Marinho, 2008). There
was also a huge default crisis brought about by declining real
incomes and growing mortgage repayment bills. Also, a signiﬁcant
number of new houses, in the middle of a recession, could not ﬁnd
a buyer. By the end of Itamar’s period some 200,000 completed
dwellings had not been sold. These were, in general, small in size,Please cite this article in press as: Valença, M.M., Bonates, M.F., The traject
to the Ministry of the Cities, Habitat International (2009), doi:10.1016/j.hbadly built and relatively expensive due to price-ﬁxing system
directly in the hands of entrepreneurs. Operations undertaken
during the Collor government under the MAS/CEF system – both at
the headquarters as well as at CEF’s decentralised network of
branches – were under suspicion and several investigations were
under way. The institutional reforms of CEF that took place in the
follow-up of investigations were critical to the new, stronger
institutional arrangements that were put in place later on. MASwas
again renamed Ministe´rio do Bem-Estar Social. As in other areas,
Itamar thus preferred to manage the crisis and leave it to the next
government to come up with ‘new’ proposals for the sector. It is
worth insisting that the Real Plan was launched in 2004 during the
Itamar period. Although underfunded, an important feature of the
Itamar government is the set up of 2 new housing programs
(Habitar Brasil and Morar Municı´pio), under the Social Welfare
Ministry (Ministe´rio de Bem-Estar Social), using small budget
allocations (around US$100,000 in 1993) for municipalities to build
houses for the poor under a self-build scheme, apart from the SFH
system (Azevedo, 2007; Bonates, 2009; Valença, 2007).
These programs introduced much of what was 10 years later
a feature of the Sistema Nacional de Habitaça˜o de Interesse Social
(Social Housing National System), that is, in order to access funds in
the program, local authorities had to set up a (state or municipal)
council and a fund as well as to contribute with part of the invest-
ment (from 10 to 20%, depending on region). These measures,
especially the former, granted participation and transparency in the
management process of both programs. Both programs had similar
characteristics, the difference being that the Habitar Brazil was
targeted to cities above 50,000 people and funds, in this case, origi-
nated from a loan contract with the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB). Both allowed the production of new housing for the poor
as well as the development of land, the legalization of illegal land
developments, the improvement of urban (including environmental)
conditions in favelas (Azevedo, 2007; Cardoso, 2003, 2007; Marinho,
2008). A scheme to grant acquisition of building materials was also
set up. During the Cardoso government, seen next,Habitar Brasilwas
continued – as this had to do with an IDB-Brazilian government
agreement –, while Morar Municı´pio was replaced by a program
called Pro´-Moradia, no longer beneﬁting from budget allocations.
The ﬁrst Cardoso period: 1995–1998
Once again, a climate of optimism took over the country with
Collor’s impeachment being followed a couple of years later by
Cardoso’s election. At that point, therewere high hopes that, ﬁnally,
there had come the daywhen a socially conscious individual, in this
case an internationally acclaimed academic, had been elected
the country’s president. Still, Cardoso threw his weight behind the
inﬂation-targeted Real Plan. Once the chronic problem of inﬂation
was halted, conditions which would be brought about by the plan
would enable the government to tackle poverty and its related
problems sooner than later.
Generally speaking, the Cardoso government’s housing policy
proposals – just like in the case of the Collor government – had
reﬂected some of the demands of organized interests relating to
house-building and housing ﬁnance. Cardoso’s proposals followed
the same principles of its predecessors. The SNH team, under
Collor, had put forward a number of new ideas, some of which very
consistent. Driven by a ‘free’ market mentality, they tended to
emphasise ﬁnance-based solutions rather than solutions that were
speciﬁcally targeted at the very poor (which required expenditure
of public funds in the form of subsidies or other). In any case, these
market-oriented solutions did in fact help a signiﬁcant number of
the Brazilian working and middle classes, despite certain ﬁnancial
technicalities not being properly sorted out.ory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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ences of the Collor administration and beneﬁted from the
restructurings that were on their way with the Itamar government,
so indeed usedmany of their proposals as the basis for new policies
and programs. To start with, rather than under a social ministry,
housing policy was placed under a secretary (Secretaria de Polı´ticas
Urbanas – SEPURB) linked to the Ministry of Planning and the
Budget. Later, during Cardoso’s second term in ofﬁce, housing
policy was under the Urban Development Special Secretariat
(Secretaria Especial de Desenvolvimento Urbano – SEDU), linked to
the President’s Ofﬁce. Just as under Collor, the Cardoso government
had to create ways to make proper use of FGTS resources, as
determined by law7. The Pro´-Credi, later called Programa Carta de
Cre´dito, gave out some 300,000 ‘letters of credit’ (promises of
a mortgage) for those qualiﬁed applicants earning within a certain
income band, which varied from the amount equivalent to 3 to 12
legal minimumwages, and this did not necessarily have to be used
for acquisition of a new property8.
In 1995, Pro´-Moradia was set up as an institutional program
using FGTS resources to ﬁnance state and municipal governments
to build new housing for low-income families, including also
legalization of land, purchase of building materials and improve-
ment of infra-structure. Some 174,119 new dwellings were ‘built’
under this program from 1995 to 1998 (Magalha˜es & Espı´rito Santo,
2001)9. As with all other housing initiatives in the 1990s, this was
not an induced action but one which relied on demand on the part
of states and municipalities. In addition, the government also
re-launched the ‘housing-linked savings accounts’ scheme, now
called Poupança˜o CEF (later renamed PCI – Poupança de Cre´dito
Imobilia´rio), a useful measure for those middle-income earners
struggling to show capacity to make payment. Here, the applicant
would have ﬁrst to save a certain amount of money (corresponding
to the future monthly mortgage repayments) for 12 months before
being awarded a mortgage (also in the form of a ‘letter of credit’).
Some 20,000 loans were ﬁnalised in this way.
Aswas the case under Collor, the Cardoso government recognised
that subsidies should be given to those most in need, however, the
government also stated that the system had to have a balanced
ﬁnancial proﬁle. According to the government itself, 85% of the
country’s housing shortage affected the poor (those earning up to 3
legal minimum wages), who were less able to solve their housing
problems through the market alone. Despite implementing the Pro´-
Moradia, the Cardoso government failed to develop a scheme to
allocate subsidies to the very poor, the lack of which was justiﬁed on
the grounds that the overall economic situation did not allow it.
Notwithstanding, the Cardoso government continued to operate the
Habitar-Brasil, set up during the Itamar period, a program funded
with budget allocations (out of IDB loans), targeted at the very poor.
The program beneﬁted some 253,000 households between 1995 and
1999. Notwithstanding, both programs were underfunded if
compared to amounts needed to tackle housing shortage and prob-
lems in the country. Before the ﬁrst Cardoso government, the central7 Data in this section was taken from the homepage of the Ministe´rio do Plane-
jamento e Orçamento <http://www.mpo.gov.br/SEPURB>; and refers to the period
from 1995 to June 1998.
8 The CEF also operated a similar scheme using savings accounts resources for
middle-income applicants earning above 12 legal minimum wages. Some 61,000
loans were agreed. A legal minimumwage was about US$100 during Cardoso’s ﬁrst
term.
9 This ﬁgure should be seen with care. As with Sarney’s SEAC program, this is an
upgrading program and so does not refer to the construction of individual housing
units. This ﬁgure is an indication of housing units which beneﬁted from improve-
ments made to the surrounding environment or to the housing unit itself under the
program.
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a sense the Cardoso government, by instituting the system of ‘letters
of credit’, actually worsened the problem of the housing shortage.
Under this artiﬁce, the applicant could ﬁnd and buy a home, old or
new, but at a price determined by themarket. In short, under the ﬁrst
Cardoso government, the focus of the housing policy shifted from
production to consumption (Azevedo, 2007; Valença, 2001).
Another development worthmentioningwas the approval of the
Real Estate Finance System (Sistema de Financiamento Imobilia´rio –
SFI) in 1997. Thiswas a demand fromentrepreneurial interests in the
sector. With this, securitization companies were allowed to operate
real estate credits (Certiﬁcados de Recebı´veis Imobilia´rios – CRI) in the
capital markets, opening up the possibility of securitizing real estate
market in the country as it is common in the USA and in several
European countries. This movement is slowly growing, especially in
the production of commercial and industrial buildings.10The second Cardoso period: 1999–2002
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was re-elected in 1998.
However, following the Real crisis at the start of term and the ﬁscal
discipline pursued by the government, economic conditions were
unfavourable to the development of a housing policy based on
sound, redistributive principles. A look at the new developments
in housing policy during Cardoso’s second term in government
points to the maintenance of the tendency to favour proﬁt-driven
investments and minimum use of budget funds. In line with this, in
mid-1998, the government successfully proposed to the FGTS
Trustee Council that the upper limit of income for beneﬁciaries of
FGTS-funded programs increased from the amount equivalent to 20
(from 12) legal minimum wages.
Although the government stuck with its determination to
maintain the system as self-supported and ﬁnancially balanced, the
second Cardoso government set up a new program which has
worked quite satisfactorily in terms of its social reach, although this
had not yet included the very poor, or those earning up to 3 legal
minimum wages. The government announced – in mid-1998 – an
‘unprecedented’ program of ‘social rent’11. However, the Rental
Housing Program (ProgramadeArrendamento Residencial–PAR) is in
fact a ‘leasing’ operation over a 15 year period. Under this scheme,
the beneﬁciary only becomes a home owner at the end of the
contract uponpayment (or the ﬁnancing) of a remaining debt, if this
is the case. More importantly, under this scheme, government
authorities had better control of building costs and quality. The
program was targeted at lower income people, that is, those who
earned the amount equivalent to 3 to6 legalminimumwages or less.
It was also targeted at the metropolitan regions where the housing
problem was more concentrated. A condition was that the areas to
beneﬁt from the program should be already serviced with basic
infra-structure. This resulted in ﬁlling up empty plots of landwithin
the city or forced local governments to make an effort to provide
infra-structure before any investment was made by the federal
government, a critical measure. A system of quality and cost control
was implemented and rents were indexed to 0.7% of total cost
a month (which kept repayments at low levels). The ﬁnancial oper-
ator is CEF but the promoters are again, as with Collor’s programs,
private entrepreneurs and municipalities (www.cef.gov.br).10 References on the Cardoso housing policy are few. See, in particular, Azevedo
(2007), Bonduki (2008), Lorenzetti (2001), Santos (1999) and Valença (2001).
11 The creation of social housing for rent was under study since the Sarney
government. During the Collor term, when the Minister of Social Action and her
team were sacked in January 1992, studies to promote a ‘social rental’ sector were
on its way.
ory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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with 88,539 housing units all over the country from 1999 to 2002.
During the Lula government, changes have been introduced in order
to lower costs of monthly rental and widen the social reach of the
program (see below on the PAR II)(Bonates, 2008, 2009).
In addition to PAR, towards the end of term, the Cardoso govern-
ment set up the Housing Subsidy Program (Programa de Subsı´dio a`
Habitaça˜o – PSH), to build low-cost housing to a population earning
from1 to 3 legalminimumwages (the verypoor).Muchunderfunded,
the program was run with budget allocations as well as state and
municipal governments’ small contributions. The system of ﬁnance is
similar to that of the Habitar-Brasil, a program created during the
Itamar government which was still operational during Lula’s second
term, except that, in the PSH, there is no foreign money. As with the
others, the PSH covers the whole of the country’s immense territory,
however, it practically exists only in smaller municipalities of the
interior, where price of land is very low or insigniﬁcant. This is
necessary due to the small amount of money which is allocated as
subsidy to the construction of each housing unit.
Having said this, the second Cardoso government shifted its
focus from consumption and re-focused on the production of new
housing. This was to a great extent due to the poor state of affairs in
the country and the president’s poor performance in the opinion
polls. Carta de Cre´dito, especially in its ‘group’ version (Associativo),
continued to be the government’s main housing program. The shift
in policy sought to counter the chronic state of unemployment in
the country with the government seeking to generate new posts in
the labour market as quickly as possible. The government also
announced a number of other new, smaller programs to revitalise
the house-building industry, including Construgiro, to provide
working capital for house-building companies, and Construcard, to
ﬁnance the acquisition of building materials to individuals.
In sum, as with Collor’s, Cardoso’s housing policy basically
operated in terms of the SBPE (savings accounts) and the FGTS
systems, as determined by law. As these speciﬁc bodies of legislation
determined that the funds be used to support house building as well
as cover ﬁnancial and administrative costs, only those with a certain
level of incomes really had (and have) access to the system. Since
the Itamar government, some budget money was used to ﬁnance
housing programs, but this was negligible in relation to the amount
of resourceswhich is necessary to face a housing shortage estimated
at over 7 million (Fundaça˜o, 2005). During the Lula government,
seen next, budget allocation improved considerably but still this
effort has not been sufﬁcient to halt the growth of the housing
shortage, a problem which is more related to the urban poor.
The ﬁrst Lula period: 2003–2006
Luis Ina´cio Lula da Silva was empowered President in 2003.
Because he belonged to the PT (theWorkers’ Party) and had aworking
class background, there was much speculation about the new
government, in academic circles as well as in the media. The expec-
tations were that he would break with the established economic
orientation of the Real Plan. Much was expected from the new
government in the housingﬁeld aswell. However, Lula chose to follow
a more cautious path, introducing changes piecemeal. The Real Plan
inﬂation/public spending controls continued to be. In the housing
ﬁeld, themainprograms started during the Cardosogovernmentwere
maintained, although some changes were introduced to them, but
new developments took place later. A new ministry was set up – the
Ministry of the Cities– to deal with urban policies, including land
regularization, housing, sanitation and transport, a landmark for the
reform of the housing provision system in the country.
The Lula government continued to operate the programs funded
with FGTS resources, like the Carta de Cre´dito, whichwere targeted toPlease cite this article in press as: Valença, M.M., Bonates, M.F., The traject
to the Ministry of the Cities, Habitat International (2009), doi:10.1016/j.ha population with a certain purchasing power, usually those who
earned from 5 to 12 (now 20) legal minimumwages. In addition, the
Lula government set up two new programs, seen further below,
fundedwith budget allocations, targeted to the very poor. According
to the Ministry of the Cities, from 2003 to 2006, some 30 billion
Reais (approximately US$15 billion) were spent on social housing.
The ﬁnancial sources were the budget, FGTS and other government-
controlled resources. In addition, nearly 9 billion Reais were
channeled to housing ﬁnance for middle-class borrowers. Housing-
targetted subsidies increased from 468 million Reais in 2002 to
nearly 1 billion Reais in 2004. Notwithstanding, as with the case of
the Cardoso government, the amount of resources which have been
allocated to housing programs has beneﬁted better-off households.
For instance, between 2003 and July 2005, the Carta de Cre´dito
program (funded by FGTS) invested R$7.4 billions; all programs
funded with budged allocations spent R$2.1 billions in the period.
The PAR program, funded by the Fundo de Arrendamento Residencial
(FAR), allocated R$2.3 billions. This meant the production of 542
housing estates with 88,611 housing units (Ministe´rio das Cidades,
2005). It is worth of note the increasing importance given to the PAR
program. Although allocating more resources to a population
earning from 3 to 6 legal minimumwages or more, in fact, all these
programs are destined to deserving clienteles. Theymight be slightly
better-off andmay be able to afford low-cost mortgages on low-cost
housing, but they are still amongst those groups of earners who
could not acquire a safe, decent house without a well-regulated
system of housing production and ﬁnance.
In any case, the Lula government made an unprecedented effort
to reach poorer groups, either introducing small changes to existing
programs or creating new ones. In 2004, for instance, an important
change was introduced to the PAR program in order to make it more
accessible to lower income groups. The so-called PAR II allowed the
level of monthly ‘rents’ to decline from 0.7% to 0.5% of production
cost. However, to allow costs of production to decline, several new
housing estates being produced under the PAR II program have
moved to more peripheral areas – here instead of apartments in
small blocks houses were built – where cost of land is much lower.
Also, in order to allow the Carta de Cre´dito program to reach lower
income groups, in December 2004, the government was allowed
to operate under Resolution 460 (Programa Carta de Cre´dito FGTS –
operaço˜es coletivas), issued by the FGTS Trustee Council, which
allowed subsidized credit for house building or purchase of housing
materials for beneﬁciaries earning up to 5 legalminimumwages. The
subsidies had a 5–20% impact onmonthly repayments, depending on
levels of incomes. The program could be operated by trade unions,
cooperatives, associations, condominiums, housing companies, state
governments, municipalities, etc. The PSH, a program created under
Cardoso, was very much changed and enlarged. This program gives
subsidies for local governments to buy or build new housing for
low-incomepeople. Between 2003and July 2005,1 billion Reaiswere
spent on this program. It is also worth mentioning a program
launched during the Lula government, the so-called Solidarity Credit
(Cre´dito Solida´rio). Using the Social Development Fund (Fundo de
Desenvolvimento Social – FDS) money as subsidy, this is meant to
ﬁnance housing for low-income earners from one to three legal
minimumwages, organized in groups, like associations and others.
In 2005, a bill (proposed by the urban reform movement under
popular demand) to set up the Social Housing National Fund and
System (Sistema e Fundo Nacional de Habitaça˜o de Interesse Social –
SNHIS and FNHIS) was ﬁnally approved by Congress. (This initiative
will be fully operational after the approval, by the government, of
the Social Housing National Plan). All these public policy instru-
ments aim at providing housing to those who cannot afford it
without a subsidy. The new fund is targeted to the population
earning up to ﬁve legal minimum wages Table 1.ory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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Summary of main housing programs.
Government period Programs Source of resources
Collor (1990–1992) Plano de Aça˜o Imediata para a Habitaça˜o (PAIH); FGTS
Programa Cooperativas;
Programa Empresa´rio Popular (PEP)




Itamar (1993–1994) ‘‘Completion of houses started during the Collor period’’ FGTS, FDS and budget
Habitar-Brasil budget
Morar-Municı´pio
FHC (1995–1998) Habitar-Brasil budget
Morar Melhor (and Aça˜o Social em Saneamento)
Carta de Cre´dito Individual e Associativo FGTS
Pro´-Moradia
Programa de Conclusa˜o de Empreendimentos Habitacionais
FHC (1999–2002) Habitar-Brasil budget
Morar Melhor
Programa de Subsı´dio a` Habitaça˜o (PSH)
Carta de Cre´dito Individual e Associativo; FGTS
Pro´-Moradia
Programa de Arrendamento Residencial (PAR) FAR
Lula (2003–2006) Habitar-Brasil budget
Morar Melhor (Apoio ao Poder Pu´blico para Construça˜o Habitacional
destinada a Famı´lias de Baixa Renda and Apoio a` Melhoria das Condiço˜es de
Habitabilidade de Assentamentos Preca´rios)
Programa de Subsı´dio a` Habitaça˜o (PSH)
Carta de Cre´dito Individual e Associativo FGTS
Pro´-Moradia
Carta de Cre´dito (operaço˜es coletivas) – Resoluça˜o n. 460
Programa de Arrendamento Residencial (PAR) FAR
Cre´dito Solida´rio FDS
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Themilitary governments and, to more or less extent, the Collor,
Itamar, Cardoso and Lula governments, understood that the system
of ‘social’ housing provision had to follow an entrepreneurial
format. In the former case, private enterprise was not the promoter
but the contractor hired by COHABs. These public companies, and
few other institutions, contracted loans with the BNH to be used for
the construction program, sold the dwellings, managed the estates
and were responsible for the repayment of the loans. Organized
under the INOCOOPS, housing cooperatives did the same. In the
Collor case, private enterprise initiated nearly 70% of operations of
‘social’ house-building. The ﬁnancial costs involved and mark-ups
made the little housing units very costly. Targeted at one type of
clientele, the units were generally sold on to a better-off one, or
remained empty. Thousands of housing units could not ﬁnd a buyer
while mortgage holders increasingly found themselves having to
default due to the form that remaining debts were updated yearly
and the effect of this on repayments.
Throughout the 1990s, housing policy was curtailed by ﬁnancial
considerations. The main criterion was not to provide housing to
a needy population but to provide ‘loans’ to those who could afford
relatively high real interest rates. The measure was thus regressive
and unfair, penalising most those at the bottom of the pile. The
system worked for a considerable part of the working class, those
formally employed. However, for the ‘poor’, the solution should
involve expenditure either in direct forms, which require supply-
side subsidies, or indirect forms, which require demand-side
subsidies. Ideally they need ameasure of both, but they did not have
much of any.With the dismantling of the BNH system in 1986, in the
absence of well deﬁned biases by the federal government, some
state and municipal housing initiatives gained visibility, but, with
the exception of Sao Paulo state –which set up a housing fund based
on a 1% increase in value-added tax (ICMS – Imposto sobre Circulaça˜oPlease cite this article in press as: Valença, M.M., Bonates, M.F., The traject
to the Ministry of the Cities, Habitat International (2009), doi:10.1016/j.hde Mercadorias e Serviços) –, most other schemes were short-lived
and targeted at solving more speciﬁc and urgent situations.
Thus, to an extent the inconsistency of housing policy in the
country was related to the institutional vacuum left with the closure
of BNH in 1986, a problem that was ﬁnally tackled with the set up
of the Ministry of the Cities in 2002. Following the end of BNH,
the various prerogatives in housing have been assigned to several
ministries and secretariatswhich have been created and then closed.
The Cardoso government, during its second term, took responsibility
for housing policy away from the Ministry of Planning, where it had
been in Cardoso’s ﬁrst term, and transferred to a secretariat under
the President’s Ofﬁce. During the Sarney term, the SEAC was under
the President’s Ofﬁce and, during the writing of the new constitu-
tion, this arrangement served the president in political exchanges
with the constituent National Congress. In view of Cardoso’s poor
performance in the opinion polls and difﬁculties in getting major
government bills passed through Congress, a recurrent problem of
Brazil’s young democracy, this move may indicate that Cardoso
decided to take a similar path. Collor and Itamar have also created
and reformed ministries, secretariats and housing programs. The
Brazilian government’s succession of new housing proposals and
measures indicates a policy discontinuity.
The Lula government moved a bit ahead, enlarging the use of
subsidies and budget money, but programs are still pulverized
in small projects all over the country. Although there is a micro
dimension to the problem, ofﬁcial ﬁgures show that the housing
problem is in the order of 7 million (Fundaça˜o, 2005). The disso-
ciation between the housing problem and policy is a feature of how
the government deals with this question today as well as before.
Much of this is to be blamed on lack of proper planning being
associated to use of government funds following a more political
and economic, instead of social logic. All programs are organized/
promoted by local authorities or local interests of all sorts. Thus the
system depends on demands which not always come from thoseory of social housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank
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despite new participatory channels in vogue.
At the root of the housing problem is not only an erratic
participation of the Brazilian government in housing policy, but
also that, overall, incomes and income redistribution are not seen
by policy- and decision-makers as important problems to be
tackled. In keeping things as they are, the severe housing crisis in
the country will only worsen. The unstable economic scenario of
the early 1990s did not allow that a market-oriented social housing
sector developed in the country. Once macroeconomic problems
were dealt with, from 1994 onwards, much due to the Real Plan,
a better balance between economic growth and social welfare
prevailed. Democratic means of control of public investments in the
sector also operated better, especially after the Lula government
and its Ministry of the Cities were empowered.
The analysis of the 1990s and early 2000s round of housing
policy proposals shows that, despite the rhetoric, more progressive
policy objectives aimed at beneﬁting the poor have not in practice
been the most predominant, with the government using as justiﬁ-
cation the would be costs involved and the country’s ﬁnancial
situation. In fact, these objectives conﬂict with the proposals that
get implemented and with the government’s own directives and
prime objective to run the system as ﬁnancially sound and self-
supportive enterprises with no or verymarginal use of public funds.
As the mark of Lula’s second term, a so-called Acceleration
Growth Program (Programa de Aceleraça˜o do Crescimento – PAC) was
launched in 2007. This includes huge amounts of investments, some
of which making use of FGTS money – the so-called FI-FGTS –, to be
allocated to (heavy) infra-structure projects of three sorts: logistics
infra-structure (including roads and train systems, ports, airports,
river transport); energy infra-structure (including electricity gener-
ation and distribution, petroleum and natural gas, renewable
energies); and social and urban infra-structure (including provision
of urban energy, sanitation, water supply, housing and metro
systems). Some R$503,9 billion is to be allocated to all this until 2010
(a four-year program), which was intended to foster an yearly
GDP growth of 5% in the country. PAC was set up to promote large
interventions to sort infra-structure problems. In the housing ﬁeld,
this amounted to some 192 projects in 157municipalities (including
those in 12 metropolitan regions, state capital cities and cities with
population above 150,000). All projects were meant to sort infra-
structure problems caused by illegal settlements near airports, ports,
train stations and major road systems.
At the beginning of 2009, following the US-led international
ﬁnancial crisis, the Lula government also launched the Minha Casa,
Minha Vida (My Home, My Life), an ambitious housing program to
build 1 million housing units. Again, the prime overt objective is
the promotion of economic growth. The plan was made by the
government’s economic ministries, not the Ministry of the Cities, in
consultationwith the real estate interests, as the major government
action to face the economic crisis. However, the program counts on
huge investments and subsidies on offer are in the order of R$34
billion (approximately, US$18 billion). The investments are to be
allocated proportionately to states according to ofﬁcial housing
shortage ﬁgures, so that 40% of housing units to be built should
beneﬁt people earning up to three, 40% those earning three to six
and20% those earning six to 10 legalminimumwages. (At the time of
writing, a legal minimumwage was worth R$465, or approximately
US$200.) Interestingly enough, 82.5% of the country’s housing
shortage is related to people earning up to 3 legal minimumwages.
The investment program is certainlywelcomedespite its focus on
economic growth, but has received criticisms regarding its form of
operation. The program is outside the recently recreated Social
Housing National System/Fund (SNHIS and FNHIS), hence outside its
mechanisms of social control and participation. It is almost entirelyPlease cite this article in press as: Valença, M.M., Bonates, M.F., The traject
to the Ministry of the Cities, Habitat International (2009), doi:10.1016/j.h(97%) in the hands of private promoters (housing construction
companies), a measure which was justiﬁed to speed up the process,
avoiding the endless procedures adopted by government institu-
tions. (State and municipal governments continue to have access to
the other existing programs, though.) Subsidies are given directly to
housing promoters, not to buyers; ﬂoor area is minimum (32 square
meters); supply is in the hands of private interests who will decide
what and where to build, although allocation of investments has
been divided according to states’ housing shortage ﬁgures. It has the
potention to generate jobs, but questions have been raised as to the
quality of the labour process in the construction industry (Arantes &
Fix, 2009; Brazil, 2009).
Notwithstanding some shortcomings, the paper shows thatmuch
has improved in terms of the country’s institutional capacity in
the housing provision system – including that at state andmunicipal
levelswhere itwas less developed –, the development of a number of
housing programs and supporting legislation. Also, starting from
a new Constitution in 1988, later there came an amendment that
made housing a constitutional right (2000); the Estatuto da Cidade
(2001),which is a federal law that regulates the constitution onurban
issues, including housing; the new Ministry of the Cities (2003),
the newmaster plans of over 1500 municipalities, as required by the
Estatuto da Cidade, the set up of the Social Housing National System
and Fund (2006), the Cities Congresses (2003, 2005, 2007) and
several other complementary legislation and government programs.
New programs allocating subsidies for the poor have been set up.
Legal, technical and institutional capabilities have beenpromoted and
improved so that popular participation nowplays a greater role in the
proper allocation of funds for the poor. All thesemeasures ensure that
the social housing policy may nowmore strongly contribute towards
enhancing living conditions in the country, acting as a redistributive
channel by diminishing economic and social inequalities in the
country.
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